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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, a ) 
Florida corporation, ) 
) PETITION FOR 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) REHEARING 
) AND BRIEF 
vs. ) 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body ) 
politic and corporate, ) 
Defendant-Respondent, ) 
and ) 
DONALD A. CATRON, an individual, ) 
Defendant. ) 
Appellant First Equity Corporation respectfully petitions 
the Court for a Rehearing of the appeal in the above-captioned 
case on the following grounds: 
The opinion of the Court, filed December 23, 1975, does not 
deal with a major issue considered by the court below and raised 
on appeal, namely, whether or not non-appropriated, non-public 
funds in the possession of USU could legally have been used for 
investment in common stock, thus rendering the University's con-
tracts with its agent First Equity not ultra vires. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 1976. 
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN 
By c^Wt^? / /y - MJtdatn 
Christine M. Durham 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Certify I hand delivered a true and exact copy of the fore-
going Petition for Rehearing and Brief to the Office of the 
Attorney General, Utah State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 26th day of January, 1976. 
(jA/tofkiif fo< £WW? 
Christine M. Durham 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, a Florida 
corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a body politic 
and corporate, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
and 
DONALD A. CATRON, an individual, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 13798 
APPELLANTS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because of the extensive treatment of the facts heretofore 
presented in this appeal, Appellant respectfully refers the Court 
to its own summary of the facts in the first five paragraphs of the 
Court's Opinion filed on December 23, 1975, and to the Statement of 
Facts contained in pages 2-12 of Appellant's Brief filed prior to 
oral argument before this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT FILED ON DECEMBER 23. 1975. DOES NOT 
TREAT A MAJOR ISSUE RAISED BY THIS APPEAL IN REGARD TO THE POWER OF 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY TO INVEST NON-APPROPRIATED. NON-PUBLIC FUNDS 
IN SECURITIES OTHER THAN THOSE LISTED IN SECTION 33-1-1. UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED (1953). AND A REHEARING ON THAT QUESTION IS APPROPRIATE 
AND NECESSARY. 
The opinion filed by this Court in the appeal brought by First 
Equity specifically states: "[ t]he direct question presented here 
is whether or not Utah State University is empowered to invest in 
common stock with public funds." It appears that the Court ruled, 
on that question without considering the issues raised in the argu-
ments and briefs on appeal as to the lawfulness of investments in 
common stock with funds from private, non-public sources. The 
opinion further indicates that "USU has no specific designated 
power from the Constitution or the Legislature to invest its funds 
in securities outside those declared lawful by Section 33-1-1 and 
investments in common stock are ultra vires acts." In light of the 
fact that the opinion does not discuss specifically those statutes 
which indicate a power to invest non-appropriated funds in common 
stock, it is appropriate for the Court to grant a rehearing on that 
question. Further, if this Court determines that any funds, regard-
less of their limited nature, could have been used by the University 
to purchase common stock, the Orders of the Court below must be 
reversed. 
-2-
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
HAD POWER TO INVEST FUNDS RECEIVED FROM INDIVIDUAL GRANTS OR DE-
VELOPMENT CONTRACTS IN COMMON STOCK, AND ITS CONTRACTS WITH FIRST 
EQUITY WERE THEREFORE NOT ULTRA VIRES. 
Respondent Utah State University has argued in this appeal 
that prior to the enactment of Section 33-1-1 in 1939, the Univer-
sities and other public corporations had no power to invest their 
funds in anything in the absence of another specific code section 
detailing a permissible investment. See Respondent's Reply Brief, 
page 9. In support of that contention, Respondent refers to a 
1936 opinion from the Utah Attorney General to the State Auditor 
to the effect that public monies, except for redemption funds, 
could not be legally invested in anything, but had to be deposited 
in selected banks. Appellant does not doubt the existence or con-
tents of that opinion, or that it may have been motivated in part 
by a reaction to depressed economic conditions, as Respondent sug-
gests in a footnote. However, Appellant points out that the opinion 
was clearly in conflict with a statute in full force and effect in 
1936, which had been enacted eight years earlier. Section 53-32-4, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) specifically provides in part: 
The Utah State Agricultural College [the University] 
in its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant, 
gift, devise or bequest any property, real or personal 
for the use of any department of the college and for 
any purpose appropriate to the objects of the college. 
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It may convert property received by gift, grant, 
devise or bequest and not suitable for its uses 
into other property so available or into money. 
Such property so received or converted shall be 
held, invested or managed and the proceeds there-
of used by the board of trustees for the purposes 
and under the conditions prescribed in the grant 
or donation. [Emphasis added] 
The University was thus given the power to receive "any prop-
erty, real or personal11, to convert that property into money, and 
to invest and manage it. In the absence of any legislative restric-
tion upon the broad power to invest funds from the described sources, 
there clearly can be no limitation on the University's power to 
invest such funds in common stock. The opinion of the Attorney 
General in 1936 notwithstanding, legislative authority to invest 
non-appropriated funds is indisputable from the language of the 
statute, which has not been repealed at any time since. In 1974, 
the Utah Legislature did place, for the first time, restrictions 
on the types of common stock that could be purchased with certain 
non-appropriated funds, in the State Money Management Act of Febru-
ary 2, 1974, Section 51-7-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
which afforded different treatment to funds from private, contract, 
or auxiliary enterprise sources and so-called "public funds . 
That the opinion of the Utah Attorney General that the Uni-
versity 's funds could not be invested in anything in 1936 was in 
error is evidenced by a 1972 opinion prepared for the State Auditor 
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by the Attorney General s office. That letter opinion is part of 
the Record in this case, being attached as Exhibit C to the Answers 
of Utah State University to Interrogatories of Donald A. Catron, 
R. 151. The opinion was a response to questions from the account-
ing firm of Ernst & Ernst, which had been retained by the State 
Auditor for auditing purposes. One of the questions discussed was 
"what investments are authorized by law for [funds pooled from free 
cash balances of various University funds for investment purposes J 
The response quotes that portion of Section 53-32-4, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) referred to above, and states: 
. . . [I]t is our opinion that the most reasonable 
interpretation to be given is to conclude that 
[Section 53-32-4] is in harmony with Sections 33-1-1 
and 33-1-3 and permits the University to invest funds 
derived from grants, gifts, devises or bequests in 
such securities or other properties as it deems fit 
or as the donor may specify. 
Even if the Higher Education Act, in Section 53-48-20, Utah 
Code Annotated, was intended to authorize only those investments 
specified in Section 33-1-1, as the above-referenced opinion indi-
cates, (but which question certainly remains open in light of the 
statutory language of the later Act) such an intent can hardly be 
attributed to the 1929 Legislature which authorized the investment 
of certain classes of funds ten years before Section 33-1-1 was 
enacted. The language of the 1929 statute, unless it is to be 
regarded as meaningless and mere surplusage, clearly evidences a 
legislative intent to permit investment of certain funds within 
the discretion of the University Trustees for the furtherance of 
the purposes of the institution and in accord with the wishes and 
instructions of donors. In this context, Sendak v. The Trustees 
of Indiana University, 260 N.E.2d 601 (1970), a case decided in 
1970 by the Indiana Supreme Court and discussed at length by amici 
curiae in their brief in this appeal, becomes very significant. 
That case held that the members of the Board of Trustees of Indiana 
University act in dual capacities as Directors of University opera-
tions (and thus administrators of public monies appropriated for 
those purposes ) and as common law Trustees of private trusts 
created by private donors for the benefit of the University. In 
construing statutes very similar to Section 53-32-4, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953),* the court in Sendak concluded that the State of 
*The statutes in question are quoted in the body of the majority 
opinion as follows: 
The legislature of the State of Indiana has officially 
recognized Indiana University as a state university, and 
at the same time by Act has made the Board of Trustees, 
under the style of "Trustees of Indiana University11, a 
body politic, which may sue and be sued and with authority 
to manage the state university. Burns1 Ind. Stat. Anno.§ 
28-5302. The Board of Trustees has in addition been given 
the special statutory power nto accept gifts, bequests and 
devises of personal and real property for the maintenance, 
use and benefit of Indiana University . . . or to be ad-
ministered for other public charitable purposes for the 
benefit or use of the students of any such educational 
institutions.11 Burns1 Inc. Stat. Anno.§ 28-5712. Further, 
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Indiana did not own the gifts given by private donors to the Uni-
versity of Indiana Board of Trustees, and that the Board could in-
vest such funds in common stock. 
The court here stated: 
The property with which we are concerned was not given 
to the state of Indiana. Thus, the State of Indiana is 
not the owner of the gifts from the private donors to 
the trustees. They were given in trust upon certain 
limitations and specifications. To say that they be-
came the property of the State of Indiana would be a 
violation of the trust imposed upon the trustees pur-
suant to the statute under which they are authorized 
to accept such funds. The trustees have a duty and 
obligation, as trustees have in a private trust, to use 
good judgment and prudence in the management of the 
funds entrusted to them and to keep them properly and 
prudently invested, with due regard to enhancing the 
income, as far as the same may reasonably and safely 
be done. The mere fact that the trustees happen to 
act in another capacity and are a corporate body affected 
with a public interest does not prohibit them from also 
acting as trustees of private funds, particularly in 
this case, where the statute specifically authorizes 
Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. §28-5713 gives the trustees 
the right to ". . . administer and use any property 
transferred to them by gift, bequest, or devise, with 
such terms and conditions, and with such obligations, 
liability and burdens as are imposed thereon. . .ff 
[260 N.E.2d at 602] 
Also in question was a provision of the Indiana State Consti-
tution, Article II, Section 12, which reads: MThe State shall not 
be a stockholder in any bank . . .; nor shall the credit of the State 
ever be given, or loaned, in aid of any person, association or cor-
poration; nor shall the State hereafter become a stockholder in any 
corporation or association.[Emphasis added] 
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such activity. It is true that the property here 
involved has certain public or charitable purposes, 
but that does not make the State of Indiana the owner 
of such funds any more than the State of Indiana is the 
owner of funds placed in trust with some other private 
trustee for the same purposes, namely, educational 
purposes at Indiana University. [260 N.E. 2d at 603] 
The Utah Legislature made it clear in 1929 that it intended 
the Board of Trustees to use the proceeds of private gifts, bequests 
and trusts in a manner consonant with the conditions imposed by the 
donors thereof, as the Sendak court held was the case in Indiana. 
It is significant that in 1974, when the Utah Legislature undertook 
a major revision of the fiscal management statutes of Utah lf(a) To 
safeguard and protect deposits of public funds by providing quali-
fications for depositories of these funds; (b) to establish and 
maintain a continuing statewide policy for the deposit and invest-
ment of public funds,11 in the State Money Management Act, that it 
did not amend or repeal Section 53-32-4. Moreover, it afforded 
funds from private sources the same treatment, more complete and 
detailed, than it had previously. Section 51-7-13 deals with the 
funds of member institutions of the state system of higher educa-
tion and provides as follows: 
(b) All funds acquired by gift, devise, or bequest, 
or by federal or private grant shall be invested in 
accordance with the rules and regulations of the coun-
cil unless the terms of the gift or grant provide other-
wise, in which event these funds shall be invested and 
managed in accordance with the standards specified in 
Section 33-2-1. 
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Section 33-2-1 deals with the judgment and care to be exercised by 
fiduciaries, and specifically authorizes the acquisition, retention 
and management of f,every kind of investment, . . . including stocks, 
preferred or common. . . ." Although the 1974 Money Management 
Act specifically amended and repealed a number of prior statutes, 
it did not amend or repeal Section 53-32-4; for it did not alter 
its provisions but merely made them more complete and detailed. 
If this Court agrees with Appellant that the University did 
have power at least from 1929 to use funds from private sources to 
invest in common stock, it follows that Utah State University's 
contracts with First Equity were not ultra vires, and that Appellant 
is entitled to recovery pursuant to those contracts. 
POINT III 
FIRST EQUITY HAD NO OBLIGATION TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT 
THE FUNDS USED BY UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY TO PURCHASE STOCK WERE 
LAWFULLY AVAILABLE FOR INVESTMENT, IF ANY FUNDS WHATSOEVER IN 
THE UNIVERSITY'S POSSESSION WERE AVAILABLE. 
The lower court in this case denied First Equity's Motion for 
Summary Judgment because it concluded that an issue of fact was 
raised as to whether sufficient non-appropriated funds were avail-
able for Utah State University to purchase the stock in question. 
(R. 435B) The Order in which the court denied that motion said in 
relevant part: 
1. Utah State University had no statutory power 
to invest public funds in common stock and that 
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contracts to purchase stock with public funds 
are void; 
2. There is at least a triable issue of fact 
whether Utah State University at the time Catron 
ordered the stock in question or the time payment 
for said stock fell due, had funds which it had 
received from individual grants or development 
contracts sufficient to pay for part or all of 
said stock; 
That Order was prepared from a Memorandum Decision filed by 
the court below in which it held that Sections 53-48-10(5) and 
53-48-20(3) do "not change the effect of [ Sections 33-1-1 and 
33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated] with the possible exception of funds 
received by the institution from individual grants or development 
contracts.11 Thus the court below recognized as a possibility what 
Appellants contend here is a fact: that the University could in-
vest certain non-appropriated funds in its possession in common 
stock. However, Appellant claims further that the Order below was 
still in error, since the possession of funds "sufficient to pay 
for all or part of said stock" is wholly irrelevant if the Univer-
sity had power to purchase such stock with any funds, thus rendering 
its contracts with First Equity not ultra vires, and legitimately 
enforceable. The University, as shown herein, had authority to 
invest certain funds from private sources in common stock. That 
being the case, any contract entered into between Utah State Uni-
versity and First Equity was not ultra vires, and First Equity 
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was not required to inquire or take steps to determine whether 
lawful or unlawful funds were being used for the investments in 
question. The Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Section 21-1-1 et. 
seqt< Utah Code Annotated, provides as follows: 
"Fiduciary1 includes a trustee under any trust, 
expressed, implied, resulting or constructive, 
executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, 
curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee 
for the benefit of creditors, partners, agent, of-
ficer of a corporation, public or private, public 
officer, and any other person acting in a fiduciary 
capacity for any person, trust or estate. [ Emphasis 
added ] 
It is clear that this definition would include Donald Catron 
as an officer of Utah State University when he was purchasing com-
mon stock on behalf of the University through the Appellant and 
other brokerage firms. 
The operative portion of the Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 22-1-5 (1953) says: 
If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by 
a fiduciary as such, or in the name of his principal 
by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in 
the name of his principal, the payee is not bound to 
inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach 
of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or deliver-
ing the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice 
that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his ob-
ligation as fiduciary, unless he takes the instrument 
with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge 
of such facts that his action in taking the instrument 
amounts to bad faith . . . [ Emphasis added] 
Thus, if the underlying contracts to purchase stock were not 
ultra vires, because Utah State University had power to purchase 
- i i . 
common stock with some of its funds, First Equity had no responsi-
bility to ascertain the source of funds for any particular stock 
purchase. Likewise, the actual existence of enough non-appropriated 
funds to purchase stock ordered would not be a relevant issue of 
fact, since a valid contract is enforceable regardless of whether 
or not one of the parties has sufficient funds to meet its legiti-
mate contractual obligations, To hold otherwise is to suggest that 
a debtor is excused from his legal obligations at whatever point he 
ceases to have sufficient funds on hand to meet them. The court 
below therefore erred in denying First Equity's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. And it also clearly erred in ordering Utah State Univer-
sity's Cross Motion be granted on the ground that First Equity's 
claim is "barred by the provisions of the Utah Code prohibiting 
the investment by state employees of funds in their custody in 
securities other than those enumerated in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 33-1-1" when it had not ruled on the possibility recognized 
by its own Memorandum Decision that not all funds were so restricted 
by Section 33-1-1, but that certain non-public funds were not af-
fected by those restrictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to reconsider the 
original Opinion filed in this appeal, and to rule that at least 
some of the non-public funds in Utah State University's possession, 
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namely those described in Section 53-32-4 at the least and possibly 
also those described in Section 53-48-20(3), were available for 
investments of a wider scope than those indicated in Section 33-1-1. 
Such a ruling will require a reversal of both Orders of the court 
below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN 
By: Norman S. Johnson 
Christine M. Durham 
Randall P. Spackman 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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